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ABSTRACT
In 2014 Planet Labs has – so far – launched two constellations of small satellites: Flock 1 comprising 28
satellites and 11 in Flock 1c. Additional launches are planned in the year, with Flock 1b scheduled for launch at
the time of writing. With launch contracts already signed for more than 200 satellites and 43 already launched,
when completed the Flock will be the largest constellation of satellites ever launched. A system of this scale
would be extravagantly expensive if comprised of traditional satellite elements, yet we have attempted this with
venture capital funding at a level that would be considered irrationally small by most aerospace standards. Thus,
to accomplish our mission significant innovation is required in all segments of the operation. In this paper, we
discuss the core engineering philosophies of Planet Labs, and the way in which our Flock is different than
anything that precedes it.
timely fashion.

INTRODUCTION
Planet Labs Inc., started in 2011 and based in San
Francisco, was formed to execute a specific mission:
to provide medium-to-high resolution imaging of the
entire planet, on a daily, recurring basis. This will be
undertaken by launching a constellation, which we
call a “flock”, of some hundreds of satellites in a
variety of orbits. Planet Labs is fully vertically
integrated, operating all aspects of its business except
launch. The company’s primary product offering is
Earth imagery and imagery-derived data products.

Figure 1: Planet Labs’ Flock revisit rate and
resolution are compared against incumbent
operators. The blue line shows the Pareto frontier
prior to the launch of Flock 1a, and the grey line
shows how Planet Labs’ system now defines the
Pareto frontier in the high-update, high-resolution
sector. The future planned capacity of some
operators is shown, with Flock 2 continuing to
dominate.

The key differentiators of Planet’s dataset are one,
complete coverage of the entire Earth’s land area, at a
resolution not currently available (3-5m in our case,
versus 1km for MODIS, and 15 m for Landsat), and
two, daily revisit of this entire sampled land area.
Figure 1 shows how Planet Labs dataset differs from
those of incumbent operators, by plotting resolution
against (our estimate) of the time it takes these
systems to map the world once. The low-resolution,
frequent update corner of this figure is represented by
MODIS1 and Landsat2, while DigitalGlobe’s
Worldview3 system and Rapideye (now operated by
Blackbridge4) are representative of high-resolutions
systems whose correspondingly narrow field of view
limits their ability to capture the entire Earth in a
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The Planet Flock stands out from the Pareto frontier5
of this chart by providing a unique combination of
resolution and full-Earth coverage repeat rate. Our
data is different to what is currently available on the
market, enabling use-cases that currently cannot be
met by existing systems. Examples include the ability
to monitor disaster situations and coordinate
1
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studies, we considered a wide range of parts from a
number of aerospace component and system
suppliers, but all were rejected either on the basis of
cost or performance, or both. We have succeeded
instead by procuring all our components from purely
Commercial, Off-the-Shelf (COTS) suppliers, and
integrating and building own circuit boards. In that
way, we look a lot more like a cell phone
manufacturer than we do an aerospace company.
(Many components were also rejected for the
additional reason of being too large, which we
discuss in the following section.)

emergency response efforts, to empowering
international development agencies to allocate
resources more effectively, to detecting events in
places that news and information cycles overlook or
can’t reach, to managing a global portfolio of
construction assets and their development over time.
Since we are monitoring the entire Earth, every day,
we are able to detect world-wide events, and also
provide insights on how they may be related to each
other. Imaging the Earth and it’s changes has not
been done to this scale before, and we cannot predict
all the value to be extracted from this high-resolution,
daily time series dataset, but we are confident that to
complete this mission, we have to do things
differently.

FINDING A
BUSINESS

NEW

WAY

TO

The current consumer automotive and electronics
industries has developed a deep and wide catalogue
of COTS tools, test faculties and hardware that can be
leveraged to solve the problems of Earth imaging.
The same tools that perform heat transfer analysis on
the latest Ford Diesel engine can also be applied to
the problem of Earth observing Nanosats. The same
electronic design tools used for the Playstation 4 are
directly transferable to spaceflight hardware. In the
Northern California area there are several electronic
testing houses that are available to provide
environmental tests for the consumer electronic
industry that happen to be very similar to those
required by NASA. Normally these houses are testing
the latest video game console or other electronic
gadget but they are available to test space flight
hardware at a reasonable cost and schedule. The
relentless drive by the consumer electronic industry
to reduce price and schedule has created an available
component catalogue that is extraordinary. Today
there is no need to develop a specialized ASIC, as
nearly all electronic functionality is available in
catalogue parts. The logical functionality that is not
available in catalogue parts is easily reproducible in
FPGAs.

DO

There is a normal trade-off between spacecraft size
and functionality, but advances in both
miniaturization and integration technologies have
alleviated the tension of that trade-off. In recent years
small spacecraft have become more attractive due to
lower development costs and shorter lead times. The
established space industry is trapped in a tradition of
requirements-driven approaches to design and testing
that have resulted in spacecraft that have become
increasingly unaffordable, in terms of cost, schedule
and mass.
While Cubesats and other small spacecraft have been
used in Earth orbit over the last 60 years, they have
not been applied to commercial Earth imaging
missions. Several recent advances have become
available to enable Cubesats to be used for Earth
observation missions. Advances in supply chain
management along with technological innovations
and commercial manufacturing practices have
allowed Planet Labs to produce a remarkable
capability in a Nanosat form factor. Furthermore,
applying lessons from the software industry and a
distributed risk approach have allowed us to build an
overall constellation architecture that can scale. We
talk about each of these in turn below.

Today the lack of power is the single largest reason
that Cubesats continue to be viewed as mere toys or
university student training devices. Spacecraft power
systems use solar cell designs that are heavy,
expensive and bulky. Traditional Cubesats have
extremely limited capabilities with regard to payload
(sensors) and spacecraft systems. Planet has
developed innovations in deployable solar arrays
without cover glass that enable these vehicles to
develop significantly more power that previous
vehicles at a lower cost and mass than ever before.

A non-Aerospace supply chain
It is unfortunate, but the Dove satellites developed by
Planet Labs contains no component directly sourced
from the space industry. In our initial design trade
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example, they are volumetrically inefficient, with the
inner volume being mostly empty space and not
useful capability. For optical satellites, especially
those with large, traditional apertures, the satellite
volume scales with the cube of the aperture diameter,
which is a severe cost penalty for a scaleable, manysatellite system. The number of satellites that can fit
in a launch vehicle – and so the cost of launch –
thereby goes with the cube-root of the aperture.
Without significant innovation in alternate optical
apertures and configurations, an ultra-large scale
system of sub-meter resolution satellites would be
staggeringly expensive, which is why we have not
seen these yet. Larger satellites are also less stiff than
their small counterparts, and so they are inefficient
from a mass perspective as well, being comprised of
heavier structural elements and significant cabling
harnesses. We have taken on this scaling challenge by
trying to create an ultra-high density microsatellite.

Many technologies have benefited from advances in
commercial industries. Today, C&DH systems have
greater processing capability with lower mass, power
and volume requirements. This general trend is
enabling small spacecraft to tackle a broader range of
missions. Power and reliability, traditionally the
primary limiting factors, have seen significant
advances due to the infusion of commercial
technology and higher risk tolerance of small
spacecraft.
Current satellite communication transmission
strategies use VHF, UHF, and microwave
frequencies. Selecting a frequency spectrum depends
on a number of factors including expected data
throughput, available power and mass, and licensing
issues. Due to these reasons, technology development
is still underway on all of these frequency spectra,
and there is no “one-size fits all” solution for spaceborne radio needs. Current technology shows a trend
of increase carrier signal frequency and the power
and mass requirements of the transmitter. Using
transmitter technology appropriate for small satellites
in LEO, UHF/VHF transmitters have a maximum
data transfer rate of around 38 kbps, S-band
transmitters have a maximum data transfer rate
around 10Mbps and X-band transmitters around
100Mbps. It was conventional wisdom until very
recently that X-band radios would not fit in a
nanosatellite. However great advances have been
made in the cell phone industry with regards to
baseband components, mixers and amplifiers and
software defined radios, such that we discovered that
all the components for an X-Band radio are available
via catalogue parts. This amazing improvement has
lowered the cost of a high-performance space radio
by many orders of magnitude. This is certainly an
enabling technology.

The telescope in the Dove satellite is a MaksutovCassegrain design with a 91mm aperture, a tube
length of 20cm and it is approximately 2.5 U (2.5
litres), which, in a cubesat, leaves little room for the
rest of the satellite bus. Furthermore, the focal length
(1.14m) is such that the focal array is placed
approximately 32cm back from the telescope
aperture, meaning the detector, an industrial CCD in
our case, is at the very rear of the satellite. The
electronics for the camera do not fit inside the cubesat
volume proper, and so instead is housed in a “tuna
can” addition to the rear of the satellite, an innovation
introduced by NASA Ames in the Genesat6 and
O/OREOS satellites7. We needed to keep a path open
for light to reach the detector. This means that the
rear third of the satellite must have an narrow optical
tube in the center, and so the bus has ended up being
a wrap-around design of total volume of about onequarter of a Unit.

Building spacecraft with lessons from the consumer
electronics industry

This is not very much space! Our mission goals
dictated the need for a full attitude control system,
large amounts of computing capacity and data
storage, and high-bandwidth communications, none
of which could really be removed without sacrificing
the mission itself. Thus, we needed a way to
miniaturize and package all of these things in the
available space. To do this, we drew lessons from the
laptop PC, smartphone and tablet industries. Apart
from some necessarily large components (reaction
wheels) the satellite looks very much like one of

Planet has invested significantly in the packaging and
miniaturization of satellite capability, drawing many
lessons from other industries including tablet PCs and
smart phones. Our goal was to compress most of the
capability of a traditional small satellite into the
volume of a cubesat. Small satellites have, since the
early 1980’s, lowered the cost of access to space and
allowed increased capability and responsiveness, but
a typical smallsat is inefficient in many ways. For
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tetrahedral arrangement as well as three air-core
magnetorquers for initial spin damping, coarse
control, safemode-attitude recovery, and general
momentum dumping. For radios, we have a 2-way
UHF transceiver, and high-speed X-band downlink
transmitter, S-band uplink receiver. The main flight
computer is a modern, low-power x86 processor with
0.5 terabytes of solid state storage and runs the
Ubuntu server operating system. None of this would
have fit in a 0.5 U volume using currently available
aerospace industry parts.

these modern consumer devices: the printed circuit
boards (PCBs) have a large number of layers, there is
an extremely high density of surface mounted (SMT)
electronics components, and almost no internal
cabling.
Some small spacecraft are assembled and integrated
with the same rigor as their larger counterparts, while
others are integrated within a university laboratory.
Effectively integrating, or sharing resources, between
individual components can substantially increase the
system’s functionality and density, thereby reducing
unnecessary mass and volume. There is a trend
towards further miniaturization and higher levels of
integration. Hyper-integration of hardware and
software also promises to bring benefit.

This dense packaging has an additional benefit: the
small scale-size of the SMT components and resultant
PCBs means that the fundamental modes of the
spacecraft are very high, outside the regime of
concern for any launch vehicle, and the overall
stiffness is high. This makes sense, as cell phones, for
instance, are designed to survive being dropped on
marble floors, which is a similar shock impulse to the
stage separation event on the Dnepr launch vehicle.
Small parts make tough systems!

The automotive and electronics industries are moving
towards levels of hyper-integration or shared
resources that are uncommon in the space industry. In
this model many of the common resources are shared,
from common power supplies to processors to
components. This has created a situation where the
latest computer the Surface Pro 3 has no serviceable
components. The package is literally glued together.
Planet Labs has adopted this approach where there
are no boxes. Everything from the instrument to the
radios shares the same resources from power supplies
to FPGAs. This has created a high-density package
that enables the small spacecraft approach.

Building Hardware as if it were Software
In 1993, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William
Perry held a meeting of aerospace execs, in which he
gave the option to consolidate or wither because the
government would no longer support the industry.8
As a result the industry was distilled into a few
primary contractors with high capital costs and
became a shining example of a monopsonistic
market, one with a single buyer and few sellers. The
consolidation was further shaped by the convergence
of three other events that would greatly determine the
industry’s capacity to innovate: 1) the cutting of costs
resulted in hiring freezes and reduction of junior staff,
2) the Silicon Valley dot com boom was pulling
talent away from aerospace, and 3) the founding
generation of engineers began retiring. This
demographic peculiarity has resulted in a monolithic
industry, stifled by capital barriers, cultural
homogeneity and an aversion to risk.

Another revolution is the use of miniaturization
technology in microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS), i.e. apparatuses with microscale (μm)
features. MEMS-based devices provide higher
accuracy and lower power consumption compared to
conventional spacecraft systems. In addition to
dramatically (100-1000X) lower size and mass,
MEMs are 100 X less expensive than traditional
spacecraft subsystems. A key result of the
combination of these factors is that spacecraft can be
designed that combine multiple copies or duplicates
of the same components so that individual units can
degrade or fail while the spacecraft continues to
function with limited system level impact.

At Planet Labs, we work to break this cycle by
embracing a more risk tolerant approach that takes
lessons from the software industry: releasing early
and often, rapidly iterating, and innovating to stay
ahead of a fast-growing market. This has largely been
enabled by Moore’s Law trends in consumer
electronics, which as mentioned above, has made
complex and powerful components smaller and more

These approaches have allowed us to create a very
dense, high-capability spacecraft bus. For attitude
determination, we have a star camera, GPS, a
photodiode array for coarse-sun sensing (augmented
by solar panel current sensors), and MEMS IMU, and
for control we have four reaction wheels in a
Boshuizen
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cheaply available. The result has been more FLOPSper-Watt-per-dollar, meaning that more power can be
packed into reduced space for lower costs. The
attraction is that smaller busses enable smaller
payloads, which reduce the complexity, team sizes,
materials, costs and development timelines.

We will discuss each of these below.
Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
In agile development, self-organization and
motivation are important. We have launched a total of
71 satellites, spanning 8 builds (builds 9 and 10 are
yet to launch) and an engineering team of under 30
for the majority of this time. This has been possible
because we have a highly motivated team whose
work is not organized around a hierarchical
distribution of tasks pulled from a plan, but rather, the
work is self-organized around learnings from
feedback loops and adaptation cycles. Learning is the
primary goal and success metric of our missions. This
is similar to the Silicon Valley approach of releasing
a Minimum Viable Product (MVP)10, which is
considered the leanest possible product that can be
built and released to test assumptions about the
products future feature set and market needs.

One of the more popular software team management
adages is “release early, release often”, which speaks
to the benefit of small iterative steps, and
incorporating early customer feedback. In the context
of space, this can only mean one thing, which is
frequent deployment into space – putting a literal
interpretation on the idea of “launching early. A
single iteration of a Dove satellite takes 8-12 weeks
from design to manufacture, and we have produced a
total of 10 full design iterations with the production
of the corresponding flight hardware in the past three
years. Contrasting this with years or decades as is the
case in other parts of the aerospace industry, we are
able to ward off obsolescence, and it enables us to
continuously integrate the latest technology
improvements into our design. Flying a large number
of satellite variations – including things such as
alternate solar panel encapsulants, battery protection
systems, and imaging sensor configurations – also
allowed us to explore another software tool, “A/B
testing.” A/B testing is primarily used in the design of
user interfaces for software products, by putting
either an A or B variant in front of two different user
groups, and monitoring how each is used. This “in the
field” testing allows useful designs to be tested and
validated quickly and cheaply, and most importantly,
helps evolve toward the best possible design with a
minimum of time-consuming engineering analysis.

For the Flock 1 mission, our team organized,
selected/built tools and created processes around a
narrow set of goals. Flock 1 was our first demo
constellation after launching 4 demo sats. The Flock
1 mission aimed to: 1) learn to operate a large
constellation of satellites, 2) test the range of
performance of our latest hardware upgrades, and 3)
optimize data downlink under realistic conditions.
We do not make long term commitments to the tools
or processes designed for this specific mission, but
re-evaluate based on the goals and learnings of each
mission. The experience gained is invaluable
however, and many hundreds of bug fixes and
software features have been rolled out between Flock
1 and 1c. This allows us to flexibly scale within a
resource-constrained environment, much like any
other software start up.

This approach is highly informed by agile
development methods, which is most recognized in
Silicon Valley as an approach to software
development. We adopt the following values outlined
in the Agile Manifesto9 and work to extend their
application beyond software to the design and
development of our hardware:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Working software over comprehensive documentation
Most start-ups have limited resources and are
vulnerable to market shifts, this forces us to prioritize
building over documenting. Our development sprints
have produced 10 builds in 36 months. In both the
software and the hardware, we have focused on
building and testing the hardware in space rather than
proving everything works on the ground and
exhaustively tracing requirements and compliance.
This is much like releasing a software MVP for betatesting, then iterating on the feedback. Further, the

Individuals and interactions over processes
and tools
Working software over comprehensive
documentation
Customer collaboration over contract
negotiation
Responding to change over following a plan
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critical path of delivering the product. The core of
this approach is feature requests and bug fixes, not
Gantt charts and delinquency reports. This does
require that all the customers have bought into this
approach and are willing to work through the process.
It is our experience that this approach of launching
with known bugs provides the most agile and cost
effective approach.

continuous integration of new technologies and
learnings is not easily documented in the traditional
aerospace way at the pace we are developing. This is
not to say there is no documentation in agile
development, rather it is out of necessity or what is
often referred to as Just Barely Good Enough (JBGE)
by Scott Ambler. Modern software development
environments allow the automatic creation of
documentation for well-written software, and we
make extensive use of this in the company: wellwritten code is its own documentation.

Distributed risk
Being part of a burgeoning competitive market,
forces us to be adaptable and nimble. This is best
illustrated by how we deal with redundancy. Rather
than building redundant systems into a single
satellite, which requires a larger team and more
materials, thus higher costs, we build redundancy into
the overall constellation. This puts the cost burden on
production rather than R&D, which is proportionately
less expensive. We plan for satellites in our
constellation to occasionally face episodic power
brownouts, latch-ups, or single-event upsets, and we
deal with that on a system level by launching large
numbers of them. This provides huge redundancy and
reduced development time, and overall reduction in
risk. It also has the additional benefit of allowing us
to A/B test different satellite variants across the
constellation and quickly respond to market shifts.

Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
Early customer engagement and collaboration
reduces the time required to learn key lessons, and
makes time to fix problems in subsequent flock
launches, which is not a luxury most other satellite
companies have. This decreases risk in uncertain or
emerging markets and the company can build what
the technology allows or what the market is
demanding. In our case, a gap in the market called for
a service to complement Earth imagery of anywhere
on Earth, with persistent Earth imagery of everywhere
on Earth, an approach that trades spatial resolution
for temporal resolution. User-centered design is an
approach in agile development that transforms endusers from simple consumers of a product into
producers, by integrating their needs and knowledge
of the market into the design process from the
beginning. We integrate customers into our
development process and this is more cost-effective
than investing in contract negotiation.

Additionally, being adaptable to change has enabled
our satellites amortize over shorter lifetimes, which
makes deploying them into lower orbits economically
justifiable. Earth observation payloads typically
require higher orbits and larger apertures, which
makes larger satellites, bigger teams, higher costs (the
vicious cycle). But smaller satellites, even if shorter
lived, have a business case and can achieve similar
resolutions with smaller optics (the virtuous cycle).

Responding to change over following a plan
At the core of this value is the ability for risk to be
distributed throughout the system and across
stakeholders – thus modifying the traditional
approach to systems engineering slightly. Instead of
spending the effort to develop an exquisite system a
more moderate approach has been adopted. This
approach is based upon a combination of demand
from the market and capabilities available in
hardware and software versus the art of the possible.
This approach tends to develop a system that is just
barely capable of achieving the systems goals with no
margin. Then during systems tests and into on orbit
test as deficiencies become evident only the actual
short falls that affect the system are corrected. It is
our experience this approach saves considerable
effort in not fixing those items that are not in the
Boshuizen

Ultimately, agile development has enabled a risk
posture that embraces learning from failure,
experimentation and rapid iteration. Doing business
this way will help us to scale to the needs of a volatile
market, ultimately diversifying the aerospace
industry, while simultaneously attracting the talent
that can innovate and disrupt the industry.
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calculations. Flock 1 provided excellent data on
thermal gradients and their effect on the satellite
subsystems, and this has resulted in a number of
passive thermal management improvements on future
designs. This in situ information is clearly better than
any on-the-ground simulation, and is a great use of
“build a little, test a little”.

IN-ORBIT PERFORMANCE
Flock 1(a)
Flock 1 was launched to the ISS 9 January 2014 as an
internal technology demonstration of the Flock
constellation architecture. The 28 satellites were
deployed over 3 weeks in February 2014 and it has
provided an invaluable platform for technology
iteration and for developing the infrastructure
required to operate a large constellation of satellites.
Due to our aggressive development lifecycle and cost,
we are in a unique position to launch real demos
instead of performing extensive ground-based
analysis. This allows us to rapidly gather real flight
data to qualify design variants and to test ground
based systems under operational conditions. Below
are some of the highlights of the mission and key
lessons learned.

We performed a number of differential drag
experiments to quantify the phasing control authority
and the ADCS performance while in a high drag 3axis attitude mode. Differential drag of this kind was
first proposed by the Aerospace Corporation in
198911 and tested for cubesats in 201212. We were
able to successfully replicate these results across all
28 satellites, dispersing them along-track by 360
degrees from front to back in 35 days. The
differential drag algorithms developed using this data
will be used for phasing and station keeping in future
flocks. We also found that the canonical coefficient
of drag (Cd=2.2) for CubeSats underestimates reality
by up to 50% at very low orbits, and we have now
invested into optimizing operations to extend orbit
lifetime.

The majority of Flock 1 satellites were RGB imaging
systems, but we included 5 variants of our imaging
system containing different optical spectral bands and
camera firmware, which informed filter selection for
future design revisions. Images taken from these offnominal satellites were given to early customers and
partners, in a great example of an MVP. We flight
qualified a number of systems that were not tested by
Doves 1 and 2, including GPS, star camera, Si based
solar cells.

Another problem with very low orbital altitudes that
the orbits provided by JSpOC-generated TLEs are
highly variable and unreliable for clusters of satellites
at sub-ISS altitudes. Having a ranging (or some other
orbit determination) capability is critical for quick
acquisition and identification of satellites. Orbits
inclined like the ISS orbit precess at a rapid rate, and
are traditionally not used for Earth observing
missions for power and scene lighting conditions.
This drove us to develop a robust concept of
operations to work within these conditions and
allowed us to evaluate such orbits for their relative
value compared to sun-synchronous.

The Flock was inserted into orbit from the ISS via the
Nanoracks deployment system. Being the first
constellation deployment from the ISS posed a great
number of technical, operational, and regulatory
challenges. By committing ourselves to addressing
these early we have now qualified many of our
systems and streamlined this process for ourselves
(and others). The low space-station like orbits
provided challenging conditions under which to
acquire and commission satellites. This has resulted
in us developing a number of novel tracking and
ranging techniques that allow us range all of our
satellites in a single pass. These techniques were used
to successfully contact all 11 of the recently launched
Flock 1c satellites on their very first ground station
pass.

Perhaps most importantly, we confronted operating a
constellation of 28 satellites in very challenging
conditions. This led to us building custom mission
control software for pass prediction/deconfliction,
satellite task queuing, and telemetry monitoring. Our
small operations team gained invaluable experience
in anomaly detection, debugging, automating
operations and in performing real time operations
trades. This experience cannot be taught or learned
through ground testing, and is something we can
leverage as we continue to launch record numbers of
satellites.

We avoided the typically arduous process of
developing a comprehensive thermal model in design
of the Flock 1 satellites, and instead relied on
engineering best practices and basic energy budget
Boshuizen
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SUMMARY
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Planet just recently launched Flock 1c, bringing the
total number of launched satellites to 43 in just 15
months. We have contacted 42 out of 43 satellites
launched (the 43rd was never deployed). Our
unusually rapid design lifecycle is enabled by a new
agile aerospace philosophy, which leverages
innovations in the software and consumer electronics
industries to get a higher return on investment. We
are participating in a fast-emerging market, which
demands we embrace risk as an inherent part of our
engineering approach. This has allowed us to learn
more lessons faster than would be possible with
analysis and ground testing. This approach has been
repeatedly validated by numerous technology
demonstrations that have provided on-orbit data and
operational experience that is unique for such a young
team. Perhaps the most important Planet innovation is
breaking the schedule and cost-cycles that the space
industry is infamous for. Without innovation in this
area, an ultra-large constellation would be impossible.
With more than 150 additional satellites contracted
for launch we are eager to continue pushing the
envelope of agile aerospace and to provide
“everyone, everywhere, everyday” products.

3.

http://www.digitalglobe.com/aboutus/content-collection#worldview-2

4.

Blackbridge/Rapideye
http://www.blackbridge.com/rapideye/

5.

Pareto analysis,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_analysis

6.

http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/missions/
2007/genesat1.html

7.

http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/smallsat
s/ooreos/main/

8.

N. Augustine, Augustine's Laws, 6th edition,
AIAA, 1997, ISBN 1563472406

9.

http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/pubscats/AR%
20Journal/arq2001/Deutch.pdf

10.

http://agilemanifesto.org/

11.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_viabl
e_product

12.

Orbital formationkeeping with differential
drag, Leonard et al., Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 12, No. 1
(1989), pp. 108-113. doi: 10.2514/3.20374

13.

Operations, Orbit Determination, and
formation Control of the AeroCube-4
Cubesats, Gengestad et al, SSC13-X-4,
Small
Spacecraft
Conference,
2013

REFERENCES
1.

http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/

1

http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landsat_program
3
http://www.digitalglobe.com/about-us/content-collection#worldview-2
4
Blackbridge/Rapideye http://www.blackbridge.com/rapideye/
5
Pareto analysis
6
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/missions/2007/genesat1.html
7
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/smallsats/ooreos/main/
8
http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/pubscats/AR%20Journal/arq2001/Deutch.pdf
9
http://agilemanifesto.org/
10
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_viable_product
11
Orbital formationkeeping with differential drag, Leonard et al., Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics,
Vol. 12, No. 1 (1989), pp. 108-113. doi: 10.2514/3.20374
2

12

Operations, Orbit Determination, and formation Control of the AeroCube-4 Cubesats, Gengestad et al,
SSC13-X-4, Small Spacecraft Conference, 2013

Boshuizen

8

28th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

